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T h e  C a s t l e  o r  t h e  T i p i :  
R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o r  I r r a t i o n a l i t y  i n  t h e  
A m e r i c a n  E c o n o m y
Ken Jameson
D URING a 1957 Notre Dame conference entitled “What 
America Stands For,” Karl De Schweinitz, Jr., examined 
the “contemporary problems of the American economy.” 
His major themes should be familiar: the effect of concentration of 
power and production on the functioning of the economy; the in­
stability which the economy exhibits from year to year; and the 
continuing tension in the economy between individual preferences 
and economic imperatives.
The writer of 1972 shares the same concerns. For a time in the 
1960’s, it appeared that some or all of these problems were in the 
process of solution. By 1972 they had reasserted their existence and 
importance. In addition, a new dimension had been added to our 
view of the problems of the economy. Since 1957 changes have 
taken place whose implications for the functioning of the economy 
would justify terming them “structural.” In addition, these struc­
tural changes have called into question the global stability of the 
American economic system. Are such changes simply adaptations 
to new circumstances, which can be easily incorporated into the 
economic structure and which may actually be system-preserving? 
Or are these changes of a very different sort, autonomously gen­
erated and contradictory to the system; does their continuance 
threaten that economic system with breakdown and fundamental 
change? There are strong views on both sides of the question, but 
an approach to an answer can be made only by close examination 
of the structural changes and their interrelations.
The paper will focus on three institutions which played a role 
in that structural change: the growth and extension of the domestic 
conglomerate firms; the growth in size and importance of the United 
States multinational enterprises; and the persistence, and perhaps 
growth, of the “economic counterculture.” Several considerations 
lead to their selection. First, in terms of increase in importance over 
the recent period, no other economic developments are at all com­
parable with these three. No one of them was considered important 
in the 1950’s, and their growth was not at all foreseen. But by 1972
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all of them play major roles in the functioning of the economy. 
Secondly, they appear to be autonomous changes which were not 
directly results of economic adjustments to maintain stability. Thus 
they seem most likely to provide the system with an internal con­
tradiction. Finally, they and their interrelations embody the sense 
and feeling of contradiction which seems prevalent. Vine Deloria 
describes this well:
The contest . . .  is between a return to the castle or the tipi. The 
difference between the castle and the tipi is immense, yet there are 
such great similarities that it is difficult to distinguish between 
them. Each offers social identity and economic security within 
a definite communal system. But the leveling process of the tribal 
form prevents the hereditary control over a social pyramid, and 
the feudalistic form has the efficiency to create and control tech­
nology.!
In economic terms, the rationalization process represented by the 
conglomerates and the multinational firms is a movement toward 
greater concentration and hierarchical control, the castle of Deloria’s 
quote. The economic counterculture is a movement in the opposite 
direction, toward the tipi, a type of economic existence which must 
seem irrational by our traditional economic standards. Does the 
continuation of these two tendencies provide the economy with a 
contradiction that will eventually result in fundamental change?
The Castle: Economic Rationalization
The conglomerate is not an entirely new phenomenon in the 
United States, but it was during the 1960’s that the increase in 
number and importance of these firms brought them and their op­
erations into the public eye. A conglomerate is a firm which is 
engaged in more than one line of activity and which operates with 
several distinct products and in several distinct geographical areas. 
By this general definition, all but the smallest firms are conglomer­
ates. In technical usage the term refers to the new type of firm 
whose primary goal is expansion and whose primary mechanism 
for this expansion is not the traditional growth through internal in­
vestment, but growth through the acquisition of and merger with 
other companies already in operation. Examples of active acquirers
1 Vine Deloria, We Talk, You Listen (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 16.
are Teledyne with 124 acquisitions between 1961 and 1968 and 
Litton Industries with 79 in the same period. An example of the 
resultant diversification is Gulf and Western; what started out as an 
auto supply company, through acquisitions now finds itself involved 
in motion-picture making, production of sugar, zinc, cigars, fer­
tilizer, and paper, and operation of insurance, investment, publish­
ing, and real estate companies.
The explanation offered for conglomerate growth is that they 
are involved in a process of rationalization of the economy. They 
claim to possess a special expertise in the management of firms and 
particularly in the management of their investment funds. They call 
this “synergism” or “asset management economies.” Acquisition of 
existing firms allows improvement in these areas and thus rational­
izes the economic process by allowing greater efficiency of operation. 
At the same time of course it results in further centralization of 
control and power and less direct control of individuals over their 
economic lives, a movement toward the castle.
To assess the impact of the conglomerate on the economy, it is 
necessary to describe their growth since 1950. The spate of acquisi­
tions began around 1950. Until 1958 the number of acquisitions ran 
at less than 500 per year, a figure somewhat higher than the average 
over this century. The pace quickened after 1958 until it hit a 
historic high in 1968 when 2,400 acquisitions were consummated. 
The pace has slowed by about 100 per year, but by historical 
standards it remains quite high.
Seemingly the effects of this movement on the structure of the 
economy have not been extreme. The share of assets owned by the 
top 200 corporations has risen from 45 per cent in 1947 to 60.4 
per cent in 1968, an average of about 7.5 per cent per decade. 
From 1958 to 1968 the rise was only 5.2 per cent, from 55.2 per 
cent to 60.4 per cent of total assets. So the conglomeration move­
ment simply continued a tendency to concentration which existed 
in the economy. Examination of concentration in individual in­
dustries shows the same pattern. In some industries, concentration 
rose significantly, but in others it did not; conglomerates were active 
in both groups. Other measures would show similar patterns of 
continuity.
Behind these seemingly stable surface phenomena, conglomerates 
were causing significant change. The main structural effect 
which the conglomerates have fostered is a change in the pattern
of “rationalization” which accompanies corporate growth and 
development. The contrast between the present conglomeration 
movement and previous merger movements in these terms will high­
light this.
There were two periods of major merger activity prior to the 
present one. Around the turn of the century, there was a great con­
solidation of the production apparatus in the country, giving rise 
to such giants as Standard Oil. The economic basis of these mergers 
was rationalization of production through the implantation of better 
production techniques. The outcome in many cases was a growth 
in monopoly, but there were benefits to the entire economy since the 
rationalization of production increased the amount of goods and 
services which were available. This was “production rationaliza­
tion.” The second merger movement, in the 1920’s, had the same 
type of result, in this case due to the utilization of large-scale plants. 
In the era of the assembly line, to compete with Henry Ford a 
company had to have the ability to produce on a large scale. This 
was the reason that a number of small auto companies joined to­
gether to form the General Motors Corporation. Other mergers 
were similarly motivated. Once again there was rationalization in 
terms of production, and the economy got more output for its 
resources.
Underlying the present conglomeration movement is an eco­
nomic goal and effect of a somewhat different sort. To be sure, 
there are elements of the same type of rationalization that occurred 
before, but they are far less important. There are some gains in 
managerial efficiency, though in many cases of acquisition the actual 
managerial changes go little beyond letterheads. The dominant 
consideration in conglomeration behavior is financial, and acquisi­
tions are carried out for their effect on the financial reports of the 
firm. In particular, the price/earnings ratio of the firm becomes a 
crucial variable in firm operation, for a high value is a key factor in 
the assessment of the firm by the financial market.
This concentration on financial considerations gave a particular 
character to much of the acquisition movement of the 19605s. 
Finances are quite affected by tax and accounting considerations, 
and it was to take advantage of their stipulations that the con­
glomeration movement took on its particular pattern, at times a 
bizarre pattern. For example, the Penn Central was quite a good 
merger partner because it had been chronically unprofitable and
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thus had significant tax losses which could be written off against 
profits of the merged company.
The economic effects of this type of expansion are interesting. 
In the first place, conglomeration did lead to some increase in 
monopoly power in various markets. Such power is rational from 
the standpoint of the firm which can much more completely 
determine the outcome of its operations. However, in the economy 
the major effect is the restriction of output and a consequent loss 
of jobs. The losses from all monopoly power have been variously 
estimated at from $15.6 billion to $100 billion per year. Earlier 
merger movements had the same type of effect, but their output 
rationalization offset the loss to the economy to a great extent. It 
allowed output to continue at a high rate at the same time as con­
centration and monopoly increased. But synergism has a somewhat 
different result. In the first place, it can be questioned whether 
such rationalization actually occurs. The Penn Central debacle and 
the recent poor performance of such conglomerates as LTV cast 
some doubt on its existence. Even if rationalization does occur, a 
prime difference remains. The effect of conglomerates is not to 
maintain output nor to improve production techniques, rather it is 
to generate a higher amount of financial profit from the firm and to 
distribute this to the stockholders of the firm. So the results of what­
ever rationalization there might be accrue not to the economy as a 
whole in terms of increases in output, but to the individual stock­
holders of the firms, that is, to those who own a piece of the castle. 
There is no direct gain in terms of output and jobs such as oc­
curred in earlier merger movements.
The conglomeration movement may appear to be a quirk of 
the 1960’s, having by now slowed because of the exhaustion of 
attractive opportunities and changes in some of the tax and ac­
counting procedures which had facilitated it. But it continues, and 
even more importantly, it occurred; and the economy has changed 
in a significant way.
The second realm of rationalization contains the multinational 
firm, commonly defined as a firm which has subsidiaries in six or 
more countries. An examination of the top 500 firms in the United 
States in terms of asset size shows that by this definition 187 of them 
are multinationals.
The multinational firm has a long history also, but the growth in 
the number of multinationals and their foreign subsidiaries has been
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extremely rapid since 1955. Peter Drucker indicates that prior to 
1955 all but a handful of American companies were that, American 
companies.2 By 1967, 187 of the 500 largest firms were multina­
tional; since 1955, the foreign manufacturing subsidiaries of these 
firms increased from 786 to 1,442; and from 1960-1970 their sales 
more than tripled, from $24 billion to $77 billion and the book value 
of their subsidiaries increased from $11 billion to $29 billion. This 
is a far higher rate of increase than occurred domestically where 
sales increased by only 69 per cent over the same period and the 
book value of assets by only 30 per cent. Once again, the growth of 
such firms must be accounted for in any treatment of the economy.
Again the explanation offered for the growth of the multina­
tionals is economic rationalization. In this case the rationalization 
operates on two fronts. First is output rationalization brought about 
by the transfer of technology and technical expertise to the sub­
sidiary country. Such implants allow greater output from the same 
resources and thus are output creating. The second effect is man­
agerial and financial. There seem to be significant economies in 
managing several enterprises from one central point, and the ability 
to operate in the international capital market makes financial man­
agement rewarding as well.
When looked at in terms of their effect on the economy, how­
ever, the results of multinational operation are very similar to those 
of conglomeration. They have little effect on output in the United 
States. There may be some increase in exports of components by 
our manufacturers with resulting gains in scale economies. But the 
major effect is really in the opposite direction, output and jobs are 
exported from the country and are carried out in other parts of the 
world. The one domestic benefit is again the generation of higher 
money profits for stockholders of the multinational firm.
This brief examination of the impact of the development and 
growth of the multinational firms illustrates again the effect of the 
structural changes of the 1960’s. While the castle is in the interna­
tional realm, its effect on the economy and on economic lives is 
very similar to that of the conglomerate. Most importantly, the 
type of rationalization which occurred is very different from that 
which the economy has traditionally seen. No longer is the domi­
2 Peter Drucker, “The New Markets and the New Capitalism,” in Daniel 
Bell and Irving Kristol, eds., Capitalism Today (New York: Signet, 1971), 
p. 66.
nant motif output rationalization with gains in jobs and efficiency 
domestically, rather, the impact is financial and is limited to a rela­
tively select segment of the country.
The Tipi: Irrationality
At the time that the corporate sector was undergoing a process 
of concentration and rationalization, a seemingly contradictory 
development was occurring in the private sector. The economic 
counterculture was developing, experimenting with new organiza­
tional and economic forms, failing, renewing, but always persisting 
and apparently growing. The dominant theme of this culture was a 
rejection of traditional economic forms and institutions and the 
search for alternatives, all of which would seem quite irrational by 
our traditional economic standards. The search for the tipi is an 
apt characterization.
The definition of the economic counterculture is difficult. How­
ever, several groups seem objectively important and their economic 
effects are of sufficient homogeneity to allow their aggregation. 
Among these are the hard-core alienated who reject the work 
culture and seek to return to some sort of subsistence existence; the 
urban or rural communal or cooperative group which endeavors to 
establish a separate economic base independent of the behavior 
structure of the dominant economic system; the ecologist who 
attempts to severely limit the amount of consumption carried out 
and particularly the resources expended in that consumption; and 
the ethnic or racial group which attempts to increase its self-suf­
ficiency while existing in close involvement with the dominant 
society.
It is difficult to assess the impact of these groups in economic 
terms, though it is certain that their numbers are small and fluid and 
the viability of their institutions is unproven. But two types of in­
fluences on the economy seem likely nonetheless. The first is the 
possible effect on the cultural basis of the capitalist structure, best 
described by Daniel Bell:
The social structure today is ruled by an economic principle of 
rationality, defined in terms of efficiency in the allocation of re­
sources; the culture in contrast is prodigal, promiscuous, dominated 
by an anti-rational anti-intellectual temper. The character struc­
ture inherited from the nineteenth century—with its emphasis on 
self-discipline, delayed gratification, restraint—is still relevant to the
demands of the social structure; but it clashes sharply with the
culture, where such bourgeois values have been completely
rejected . . ,3
So Bell finds a contradiction between the culture and the economy. 
He concludes that “culture has become supreme.55 In other words, 
the economic system will soon begin to dance to the tune of the 
counterculture. While such a likelihood cannot be dismissed, the 
case is not completely convincing. In the first place, it is equally 
plausible that the causal factor in these developments is the same 
rationalization that was mentioned before, that its effect on the 
work experience and the economic experience is affecting the culture 
in significant ways. A second objection is more fundamental. The 
economy, and particularly its corporate sector, has its own culture 
which shows very few signs of losing its viability. There have been 
examples of betrayals of that culture such as Up the Organization, 
but they are so few as to illustrate the point. More direct evidence 
comes from one major attempt to confront the corporate sector 
with the new cultural themes. This was an effort by the Los Angeles 
County Museum of Art to place contemporary artists with business 
firms for 12 weeks or more for an “encounter between art and 
technology.5’ Spawned by the encounter were progeny such as the 
suggestion to the Rand Corporation that it shut off its phones for a 
day and have a picnic in the patio, or “Giant Icebag,” a 16-foot 
sculpture resembling a salmon-colored icebag which does a 20- 
minute dance number. Perhaps the best expression of the impact 
of the experiment was by Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute 
when he heard his artist’s suggestion to produce an edible book with 
the world’s 100 greatest quotations. Said Kahn, “Why are we 
bothering with Jim? After all, I want the organization to run 
right.”4 If this experiment is any indication, the corporate culture 
is hardly experiencing catatonia in reaction to the onslaught of the 
counterculture.
There is another level, however, on which the economic counter­
culture may definitely affect the overall economy. The members 
of this culture are in some sense a part of the economy and their
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3 Daniel Bell, “The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism,” Capitalism 
Today, p. 30.
4 Earl Gottschalk, Jr., “What’s That Thing Resembling a Giant, Salmon-
Hued Ice Bag?,” The Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1971, p. 1.
economic actions will affect its functioning. Looked at in this light 
there are two areas of behavior where the effect will be greatest. 
The first is the relation of the members to the economic labor 
market. In almost all of its manifestations, the economic counter­
culture rejects the usual participation in the job market. Production 
line jobs are to be avoided at all costs, and if any labor beyond 
subsistence labor is required, it should be of a nonalienating sort. 
In economic terms, this reduces the effective supply of labor and our 
models suggest that consequently the rate of growth of the economy 
should slow with resultant tendencies toward stagnation and eco­
nomic strain. Counterculturalists also play another role in the 
economy, that of consumers or nonconsumers. It is again a fairly 
uniform characteristic that traditional consumption patterns are 
rejected, partly out of the cultural norms themselves and partly as 
a result of the work attitude. Looked at in terms of usual economic 
concerns, such a fall in the aggregate demand of the economy 
could have very detrimental effects on its operation. The continu­
ally astounding success of the economy in avoiding “secular stagna­
tion55 has been largely a result of the growth of consumption demand. 
In a fundamental way the economy is a consumer economy, and 
disruptions at this level could lead to economic instability.
The thesis which Bell expounds is interesting and may eventually 
be important for the economy and its functioning. However, at this 
point it seems that the contradiction of rationalization and irra­
tionality, of the castle and the tipi, could very well exist at a purely 
economic level. The rejection of the traditional participation in the 
labor market, coupled with the attempt to break the pattern of 
consumption which has traditionally buoyed the economy, could 
well place a severe strain on that economy and could indeed lead 
it to a fundamental transformation.
The Interrelations
While the above developments were individually notable in their 
rapidity and importance for the economy, it is their interrelations 
that reflect most directly on its overall stability.
The relation of conglomerates and multinationals is quite direct, 
for many of the conglomerates are also multinational firms. Of the 
25 most active conglomerates in terms of their acquisitions from 
1961-1968, nine would also be classified as multinational enterprises.
This close relationship promises to become even closer in future
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years. Evidence comes from the data on multinational expansion 
through acquisition of existing firms in other countries. During the 
first year that data were available, 1963, there were 228 such acqui­
sitions. But by 1968 the number had risen to 800 and in 1969 it 
reached 847 acquisitions, a number which is over one-third of the 
acquisitions within the United States by the conglomerate firms. 
Stronger evidence of the importance of this trend comes from ex­
amining the mode of institution of subsidiaries. For manufacturing 
subsidiaries in foreign countries, we find that of those founded before 
1946, 40 per cent were instituted through acquisitions; of those 
beginning between 1946 and 1957, 44 per cent were through ac­
quisitions; but 60 per cent of the foreign subsidiaries formed 
between 1957 and 1967 came about by the acquisition route, a sub­
stantial increase. So what may be developing is a new form of 
organization, the “multinational conglomerate.”
Some recent occurrences may accelerate the tendency of overseas 
expansion through acquisitions. ITT notwithstanding, there is 
evidence that the Justice Department is discouraging domestic con­
glomeration efforts. Changes in tax and accounting practices have 
had somewhat the same result. At the same time, there are recent 
changes in accounting procedure that have made overseas involve­
ment more attractive to firms seeking improvements in earnings. 
This adds plausibility to the widespread prediction that by 1985 
virtually all of the output of manufactured products will come from 
some 300 multinational corporations, producing a wide variety of 
products in a wide variety of locations.5
Some direct effects of these developments on the stability of the 
economy may already be apparent. First, the dollar crisis of 1971 
can be laid partially at the door of these enterprises. A major con­
stituent of the United States payments deficits has been the capital 
funds flowing overseas, and a major reason for this flow has been 
investment by our companies in other countries. Recently the situ­
ation has been made more acute by the United States trade position, 
where our exports haven’t kept pace with our imports. This again 
is partly a function of business expansion overseas, for overseas 
production can substitute for domestic production and subsequent 
export. Also, many subsidiaries now actually ship goods to the 
United States, increasing our imports. Thus on all of these fronts 
the multinational conglomerate played an important role in our
5 Drucker, op. c i t p. 67.
dollar crisis and is likely to continue doing so. Secondly, growth of 
the conglomerates has led to an increase in the coordination of their 
activity with government policy. ITT can truthfully say that gov­
ernment restraints on its activity will upset the entire economy. It 
can also make a convincing case that actions taken by the govern­
ment of Chile will have similar effects. Thus the pressure on policy­
makers is significant. The multinational conglomerates’ need for 
government sanction is partly because they are at the frontier of 
the law, and developments in the law will affect their well-being 
more than they would the older, more established types of firms. 
But their dependence is also because of the nature of these firms 
whose involvements span several industries or countries and whose 
financial situation can be severely strained by disarray in any one 
of these. Thus general economic order is essential, and political 
power is the most effective means of obtaining it. Previously, cartel­
like agreements might have been effective, but this is no longer true. 
Now government aid is necessary for stability.
Given this tendency to instability caused by the rationalization 
movement, the effect of the economic counterculture on the econ­
omy could indeed represent a basic contradiction through its effect 
on consumption and on the job market. The members of the eco­
nomic counterculture are not good consumers, and the effect of its 
growth is to reduce aggregate demand. This would seem to be an 
added disruptive influence on the corporate sector, for such a 
decrease in final demand could cause a slowdown in economic 
growth and rationalization, with resulting pressure on the opera­
tion of business. However, the earlier analysis suggested an im­
portant reason for doubting a fundamental contradiction on the 
level of consumption. It was noted that the dominant consideration 
and effect of expansion by multinational conglomerates is financial 
and is divorced from the output questions of earlier years. As long 
as there are opportunities for financial gains through acquisition 
and merger, the process can continue. Of course stagnant aggregate 
demand would eventually limit financial maneuvers. However, the 
rapid growth of overseas sales indicates that this area may provide 
adequate growth in demand to forestall any such eventuality in the 
proximate future. Thus the conclusion is that in economic terms, 
the effect of the economic counterculture on consumption does not 
provide the system with a basic contradiction.
The second link is in the area of jobs. One implication of the
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relative independence of multinational conglomerates from domestic 
aggregate demand is that their interest in internal expansion and 
job creation is greatly lessened. Expansion of production facilities 
provides jobs, but the conglomerate mode of operation is primarily 
financial expansion. The multinational firm also operates in a 
fashion that will slow the creation of jobs domestically. This could 
be a source of extreme instability in the domestic economy, but it is 
here that the economic counterculture may have its most important 
effect. To the extent that the job becomes less important to a 
viable life style, the less need there is for the economy and its firms 
to create jobs. Thus in the extreme, the economy would not be 
damaged at all if there were no new jobs created, as long as enough 
persons were willing to leave the job market and to enter the 
economic counterculture. It is difficult to say how important this 
factor is at present, let alone how important it will be in the future; 
but suffice it to say that the present disarray in the labor market, 
best seen in the wage-price freeze, and the difficulties economic 
policy is having in that area suggest that such an outlet valve may 
be essential for the continued functioning of the economy. This may 
become even more the case as conglomerate expansion continues. 
So once again no contradiction is visible.
The Castle or the Tipi?
The dominant structural changes in the economy of the 1960’s 
and beyond were the tendency to rationalization in the conglomer­
ates and multinationals and the development of a viable economic 
counterculture, irrational by usual standards. The view is wide­
spread that these were contradictory trends which might force fun­
damental change on the economy. An initial examination of these 
two tendencies seemed to support this view, but closer examination 
yields a different conclusion. The economy will not be forced to a 
new basic structure, the castle or the tipi. Rather, the operation of 
the economy may well depend on the continued coexistence of these 
two competing but basically complementary spheres. With the sub­
stitution of financial motives in expansion and the shift in concen­
tration of energy to the multinational sphere, the ability of the 
economy to incorporate the entire populace seems severely ham­
pered. Such a failure would have had severe repercussions in previ­
ous periods, but with an alternative approach to economic life now 
available and attractive, such is not the case. In the final analysis,
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castle and tipi interrelate in a fashion which yields stability to a 
system which would otherwise be unstable.
This does not imply, however, that there is complete consistency 
in the economy, only that the contradictions are not internal. The 
analysis suggests contradiction from a different side. If the possibil­
ities of international expansion open to the multinational conglom­
erates were to be significantly narrowed, the effect of the economic 
counterculture would no longer be beneficial. Its effect on the 
consumption front and on the job front would quickly begin to cut 
into the dynamic of the corporate sector, forcing a type of adjust­
ment that might be impossible for a multinational conglomerate. 
So it is in the international sphere that the potential for instability 
exists; it is there that the contradiction may lay. Changes inter­
nationally might finally force a decision between the castle and the 
tipi.
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